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ABSTRACT 
SONY PICTURES AND THE U.S. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: A CASE STUDY 
ANALYSIS OF THE SONY PICTURES ENTERTAINMENT HACK CRISIS USING 
NORMAL ACCIDENTS THEORY 
by Mohamed Ismail 
December2017 
In this case study, I analyze the 2014 North Korean computer database hack of 
Sony Pictures Entertainment (SPE), a serious national security crisis of cyberterrorism. I 
utilize Normal Accidents theory as a lens, to help explain how the accident within one 
system (SPE) and later crisis lead to the interaction with a second system (U.S. Federal 
Government), the development of a new crisis, and the need for a crisis response from 
system two. The evolution of a single organization’s accident into a national security 
crisis does not occur without specific complex interactions that take place to connect the 
two systems together. To explain this interconnectedness between systems, I introduce 
two new constructs: 1) common denominator and 2) common goal, which expand 
Normal Accidents theory allowing it to account for the coupling between the two 
independent systems (SPE & United States Government) through non-linear interactions. 
Overall, this case study provides important insight for future crisis communication 
planning, response, and development regarding between-organization interaction during a 
crisis.  
  
  iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 I would like to thank my university and department, the University of Southern 
Mississippi and Department of Communication Studies for providing me with a platform 
to grow as a scholar over the years. I am proud to have completed this project and my 
graduate studies here. 
 Thank you to my advisor, Dr. Steven Venette for being there to guide me 
throughout this project. From day one in our crisis communication class when I first 
proposed this research to you as a class paper you have always been supportive and 
empowering. It has been a great pleasure to learn from you, work alongside you, and 
receive your assistance, insight, and encouragement throughout this project, and I thank 
you greatly. Also, I would like to thank my committee members Dr. Kathryn Anthony 
and Dr. John Meyer for all their feedback and guidance during this project that boosted 
me to develop an overall stronger piece.  
A special thanks to Dr. Wendy Atkins-Sayre for shaping my graduate school 
trajectory and experience. You have always been an endless source of genuine and caring 
support throughout the entirety of my graduate tenure and I appreciate it more than you 
will ever know. Moreover, thank you for providing me the opportunity to work for you in 
the USM Speaking Center. Without being a Speaking Center graduate tutor I do not 
believe my graduate school experience would have been as fulfilling and liberating as it 
has been. That opportunity alone I hold immensely dear, thank you. 
Dr. Keith Erickson, even when I was a sophomore in your Introduction to Public 
Speaking course you saw in me a communication scholar that I never knew existed. I 
remember vividly after my speech your feedback notes saying, “you should be a comm 
  iv 
student” and here I am now. Your wisdom, mentorship, and friendship from that day 
forward was the catalyst for why I pursued my graduate degree in Communication 
Studies, and I cannot express my gratitude to you enough.  
Thank you to all my friends for your endless camaraderie. Each of you in your 
own way gave me so much life and joy amidst the various responsibilities that 
accompanied graduate school. A special thanks to my dear friends and colleagues, Tori 
Brown and Carley Reynolds. You two are the one and two to our three musketeers. 
Thank you for being such loyal, caring, present, and giving friends. From being together 
during tough academic endeavors to our late-night laughs and drives, I am blessed to 
have met you through scholarship and have you as my friends for life. 
Finally, and with my entire heart, soul, and being I thank you, my beautiful wife – 
Olivia Ismail, my lovely mother – Dr. Nagwa Megahed, my brilliant father – Mohi 
Ismail, and my wonderful brother – Ahmed Ismail. There are no words that can truly 
explain how thankful I am for all of you, but here goes. 
Olivia, يتجوز, the definition of altruism holds no meaning without your existence. 
Every single step of the way, even when I did not want to take anymore, you were by my 
side with unconditional love and unwavering support. During this project from its 
inception to its final sentence, you made sure I stayed the course and successfully 
finished what I began. You were my coach, my cheerleader, my team, and everything in 
between, and without you this project would not be complete. Habibty, I thank you for 
everything that you are and all that you have been for me in life and throughout this 
process. These feelings won’t go away. I love you!  
  v 
Mom, يمأ, it is my absolute honor to be your son, the son of the greatest professor 
ever – YOU! I was 10 years old when I watched you walk across the stage at the 
University of Pitt to receive your PhD, a triumphant moment engrained in my memory 
forever and a guiding light for where I am today. You are the most outstanding scholar 
and mother, and I am beyond lucky to have both all-in-one! Whether it was to check up 
on me and make sure I was okay or guide me through every academic project since 
elementary school including this one, you have been my mentor, my advisor, and my role 
model. You are the sun to my garden that has helped me grow abundantly. I love you!  
 Dad, يبا, the depths of the ocean are unmatched to the depths of your wisdom and 
care. It is my greatest privilege to be your son. The road to finishing this thesis was like 
the cobblestone road you taught me to ride my bike on – hard and unsteady at times. And 
just like on the bike, I fell a few times. Yet, just like you did back then when I was scared 
to get back on and try again, you made sure I pedaled my way strong to the end of this 
project. I love you! 
 Ahmed, يخا, as I have said countless times before: you inspire me! You motivate 
me, and because of you I always challenge myself in aim of being the best role model for 
you, whether as a scholar or brother. Throughout this project, I remember calling you on 
many occasions to talk or just vent to you, and you listening intently in godly support. 
You provided me with perspective way beyond your years that rejuvenated my soul and 
gave me strength to continue my pursuit. I love you! 
 In close, alone in this endeavor, I was never. To all, I thank you kindly. 
  
  vi 
DEDICATION 
To my wife, mother, father, and brother. 
The greatest part of my life. 
Shokran. 
  
  vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................ ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... iii 
DEDICATION ................................................................................................................... vi 
CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................1 
Significance......................................................................................................................3 
Overview of Chapters ......................................................................................................6 
CHAPTER II - LITERATURE REVIEW ...........................................................................8 
Theoretical Framework: Normal Accidents Theory ........................................................8 
Complex Organizations .................................................................................................14 
Summary ........................................................................................................................17 
Rationale ........................................................................................................................17 
CHAPTER III - METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................19 
Case Study Analysis ......................................................................................................19 
Why Case Study Analysis? ........................................................................................21 
Data Collection ..........................................................................................................23 
Selection of Sources ...................................................................................................24 
Selection of Timeline .................................................................................................25 
Data Analysis .................................................................................................................26 
Theoretical Propositions ............................................................................................28 
CHAPTER IV - CASE ANALYSIS ..................................................................................30 
Sony Pictures Entertainment Hack: was it really a crisis? .............................................30 
Phase 1 – Saying Hello: The Shakedown of the SPE Database ................................30 
  viii 
Phase Two – Flirting with National Security: Confidentiality Aflame .....................33 
Phase Three – It’s Official: National Security Crisis for The Interview ...................37 
CHAPTER V - CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH .......44 
SPE Hack: A Normal Accident in One System .............................................................45 
How Two Independent Systems Suffered an Interconnected Accident .........................46 
Common Denominator...............................................................................................47 
Common Goal ............................................................................................................51 
Implications....................................................................................................................54 
Expansion of Normal Accidents Theory....................................................................54 
Common Denominator and Common Goal ...............................................................55 
Application of New Propositions ...............................................................................55 
Future Research .............................................................................................................57 
Existing Cases ............................................................................................................57 
Obscure Cases ............................................................................................................58 
Between-System Accident Dynamic .........................................................................59 
Limitations .....................................................................................................................60 
Information Outlets ....................................................................................................60 
Data Source Type .......................................................................................................60 
Overall Conclusion ........................................................................................................61 
REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................63 
 
  
  ix 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
Figure 1. Common Denominator 1 Between SPE and Federal Government ................... 50 
Figure 2. Common Denominator 2 Between SPE and Federal Government ................... 50 
 
  
  x 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
SPE    Sony Pictures Entertainment 
GOP    Guardians of the Peace 
USM    University of Southern Mississippi 
 
 
 
  1 
CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION 
The 2014 North Korean computer database hack of Sony Pictures Entertainment 
(SPE) stormed to the forefront of the nation’s attention as not just a great piece of 
celebrity news, but as a serious national security crisis of cyberterrorism. This cyber 
terrorist attack in its early stages was presumed to be a hoax. However, as it transpired 
and email threats were followed through by action it became evident that this was indeed 
a crisis that needed national security intervention.  
Many Americans are familiar with the concept of terrorism, and upon hearing the 
word can automatically conjure a specific mental picture in connection (Hermann, 1984). 
The American Civil Code defines terrorism as “premeditated violence, politically 
motivated against civilians, committed by local groups or clandestine agents, in order to 
influence a target audience” (American Civil Code, as quoted by Paul, Bugnar, & Mester, 
2015, p. 7). However, in this technological age terrorism can extend beyond our physical 
world in forms that surpass the generic “violence” as noted in the above definition, and 
this extension is known as cyberterrorism. “Cyberterrorism means premeditated, 
politically motivated attacks by sub national groups, clandestine agents, or individuals 
against information and computer systems, computer programs, and data that result in 
violence against non-combatant targets” (Janczewski, 2007, xii). In turn, rather than a 
physical act of terror cyberterrorism transforms terrorism to a virtual attack that is 
boundless through an Internet world. 
Cyberterrorism has proven to be of major concern for various reasons (e.g., 
privacy, security, economics, and freedom) organizationally, nationally, and 
internationally (Atalay & Sanci, 2015; Yong-joon, Hyuk-jin, Jaeil, & Dong-kyoo, 2015). 
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Currently, with the social and financial lives of individuals being readily available and 
accessible on the Internet, it allows for easier connectivity and takeover of that which 
people hold valuable (Matusitz, 2014). The unsettling aspect of cyberterrorism is its 
ability to take on any form to ruin its target; the spread of incorrect information, the 
collapse of a computer system, and information altering are just a few of the methods 
used via cyberterrorism to affect the target population (Kennedy, 2001; Matusitz, 2014; 
Weimann, 2005). 
The SPE hack serves as an act of cyberterrorism because the hackers – 
“Guardians of Peace” – were later identified as a national Korean group (The White 
House, 2015a). This group used this hack as a politically motivated attack against SPE’s 
computer system to stop SPE from releasing its film – The Interview, which satirically 
depicted the North Korean Supreme Leader, Kim Jong Un. This act of cyberterrorism 
later transformed into a national security crisis once it negatively impacted American 
values (freedom of speech), shut down a major non-combatant organization’s (SPE) 
system, and destroyed certain private information of American citizens (SPE Employees). 
Ultimately, the SPE hack is an exemplar of a crisis catalyzed through cyberterrorism as it 
took control of a major corporation’s system via Internet connectivity, and consequently 
shocked a nation’s sense of security and normalcy. 
However, crises are not “one-size-fits-all” but vary in type and intensity (Seeger, 
Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003). Generally, a ‘crisis’ is an “unusual event of overwhelmingly 
negative significance that carries a high level of risk, harm, and opportunity for further 
loss (Seeger et al., 2003, p. 3). Nonetheless, in Heath and O’Hair’s (2010) risk and crisis 
communication handbook and Coombs and Holladay’s (2011) handbook on crisis 
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communication they define crisis and crisis communication, and provide Coombs’ 
inclusive and holistic definition of crisis: 
A crisis can be viewed as the perception of an event that threatens important 
expectancies of stakeholders and can impact the organization’s performance. 
Crises are largely perceptual. If stakeholders believe there is a crisis, the 
organization is in a crisis unless it can successfully persuade stakeholders it is not. 
A crisis violates expectations; an organization has done something stakeholders 
feel is inappropriate. (Coombs, 2009, p. 100) 
Based on the definition of crisis, the SPE hack is a more focused form of crisis, and can 
be identified as an organizational crisis – “a specific unexpected and non-routine 
organizationally based event or series of events which creates high levels of uncertainty 
and threat or perceived threat to an organization’s high priority goals” (Seeger, Sellnow, 
& Ulmer, 1998, p. 233) that was induced by an act of cyber terrorism. 
Significance 
Crisis communication literature has looked at various organizational crises to 
study each organization’s mode of operation pre-crisis, during crisis, and post crisis (see: 
Benoit, 1995; Coombs, 1999; Seeger, 2006; and Seeger, et al., 2003). Seeger (2006) notes 
that there exists various crisis types and different dynamics within each crisis that 
prompts crisis communication scholars to develop adequate strategies to address these 
variances in crises. The Sony Pictures crisis is a unique case to study as it includes the 
interconnectedness of two separate organizations, a private company – SPE – with a 
public entity – U.S. Federal government – in response to a crisis. Therefore, it serves as a 
novel organizational crisis to analyze for crisis strategy development. More importantly, 
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this study is unique in that it uses Normal Accidents theory to better understand these 
complex interactions between systems during a high stress crisis event. A between 
systems crisis is when the crisis of one organization directly impacts a second 
organization. In this case, the initial interaction is between Sony Pictures Entertainment 
and the United States Federal Government; which later lead to a national security crisis 
between the U.S. and North Korea.  
Existing literature studying the interaction between two separate organizations in 
response to the crisis of one does not explore this phenomenon using Normal Accidents 
theory as its central point of analysis (See: Gotham, 2012; Millner, 2011; and Millner, 
Veil, & Sellnow, 2011). Millner et al. (2011) highlights how third party organizations 
within affiliated industries serve as proxy communicators in resolution of a crisis when 
the main organization fails to appropriately respond. Gotham (2012) notes that the 
implementation of policy from certain organizations (e.g., financial firms) can develop 
problems in other organizations (e.g., mortgage market) and later lead to full-blown crisis 
(e.g., 2007 U.S. financial housing crisis) via a cascading effect (i.e., Crisis-Policy Nexus). 
However, these studies do not indicate how two varying systems interact through the 
sharing of each other’s subsystems in response to the initial accident and later against the 
unfolding of a new crisis. 
Additionally, the existing literature does not highlight the interaction between a 
private organization and a public entity, as shown in this case. Liu, Horsley, and 
Levenshus (2010) identify the differences and similarities between government entities 
and private sectors. However, these findings only indicate how the private and public 
sector would individually communicate given the potential emergence of a situation. The 
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study does not assess a “real-life” case where the two organizations interact and their 
communication intersects in response to a specific happening. This current study does. 
Thus, an analysis of the Sony Pictures hack crisis and its interaction with the U.S. Federal 
government is of significance for communication scholars to better understand using 
Normal Accidents theory as the underpinning that facilitates the interaction of these two 
separate types of organizations during a crisis. 
This evolution of a single organization’s crisis into a national security crisis does 
not occur without specific communicative interactions that occur to connect organizations 
together. Communication scholars have developed a plethora of research on the role 
communication plays within organizational crises and the best practices for 
organizational crisis management (Seeger, 2006). Coombs (2010) states that, "the reality 
of crises leads to the need for preparation and readiness to respond – crisis management. 
The critical component in crisis management is communication” (p. 17). Previous 
research on crisis communication has primarily focused on crisis prevention and 
management within one organization, but has fallen short in identifying strategies that 
assist when one crisis effects two organizations of varying make-up simultaneously. 
Therefore, it is essential to further expand the existing research on best practices and 
communicative crisis management strategies to assist organizations in crises that involve 
between-organization interaction. 
In this paper, I uncover the role communication plays in between-organization 
interaction during a crisis. I use Normal Accidents theory as the guiding theoretical 
framework to analyze the case. Normal Accidents theory has only accounted for 
accidents that manifest within one system. In turn, this study expands Normal Accidents 
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theory’s reach allowing it to explain complex interactions between two systems. 
Furthermore, I use an explanatory case study approach with descriptive analysis to 
understand how the Sony Pictures hack became an organizational crisis, and why it 
interacted with the U.S. Federal Government to then create a national security crisis.  
Current crisis communication case study research usually focuses on a single 
crisis and how it impacts the one organization’s operation (see: Venette, Sellnow, & 
Lang, 2003). These case studies are used to highlight both the successes and failures of 
organizations when managing their crises. In turn, researchers take these various case 
study findings and develop a foundation of advice for future organizations regarding their 
crisis plan (Coombs, 2010). 
 Using the case study approach, I identify how these two organizations interacted 
with one another during a crisis. This extends the case study method within crisis 
communication to include the analysis of interconnected crises that impact system wide 
operations across multiple organizations from a Normal Accidents theory perspective. It 
reveals how the failure of one organization (SPE) due to cyberterrorism negatively 
impacts a second organization (United States Government) to create a greater 
independent crisis – national security threat between the United States and North Korea.  
Overview of Chapters 
 This study is arranged into the following chapters. Chapter two provides a review 
of literature focusing on Normal Accidents theory and complex organizations. Chapter 
three presents an overview of the methodological approach utilized – explanatory case 
study with descriptive analysis under a single case study design. In it, I justify why case 
study analysis was the qualitative method of choice for this research; I highlight how the 
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data was collected; and finally, I discuss how the data was analyzed. Chapter four 
provides detailed information regarding the SPE hack crisis case and stitches together its 
evolution and transformation throughout the progression of the crisis using a timeline 
narrative approach. Finally, chapter five discusses the pertinent conclusions of this 
research project. Moreover, chapter five highlights implications, limitations, and future 
research opportunities. The next chapter reviews literature applicable to this research. 
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CHAPTER II - LITERATURE REVIEW 
Theoretical Framework: Normal Accidents Theory 
 When crises occur, they are usually catalyzed via a specific occurrence that 
disrupts the state of operational normalcy in an organization (Perrow 1999; and Seeger 
2002). Crisis communication aims to establish proactive, pre-crisis, means against this 
disruptive occurrence from ever happening. This proactive intervention can only be 
established through a breadth of understanding related to the organizational make-up 
where the crisis can take place (Coombs, 2014).  
Charles Perrow (1999) argues that as human development continues to expand 
through technology, political agendas, and globalization systems are created to account 
and manage for this expansion, specifically technologically advanced systems. Systems, 
as Perrow (1999) points, are organizations, and these systems in and of themselves 
contain subsystems that constitute the organization’s internal infrastructure (from this 
point forward ‘systems’ and ‘organizations’ will be used interchangeably). These systems 
continue to grow in intricacy and complexity, which increases their “riskiness” and in 
succession makes them predisposed to being of catastrophic potential. However, Perrow 
(1999) argues that because of this increased complexity within systems these disruptive 
occurrences become “normal accidents” that are inevitable due to the innate high-risk 
nature of these organizations. An ‘accident’ is an unintentional occurrence that disrupts 
normalcy by causing damage to people, objects, or both (Coombs & Holladay, 1996; 
Perrow, 1999; Seeger 2002; and Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003). Thus, “if we can 
understand the nature of risky enterprises better we may be able to reduce or even remove 
these dangers” (Perrow, 1999, p. 3). More importantly, if accidents in increasingly 
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complex systems are normal and in turn inevitable, we as communication scholars must 
identify means to address these accidents as an extension of the organization’s normalcy 
without allowing them to manifest into crises. 
 Perrow (1999), through analysis of various high-risk system accidents, developed 
Normal Accidents Theory, a theory that explains how organizational crises of 
catastrophic consequences occur via accidents within systems due to their interactive 
complexity. In this section, I explain the major concepts of Normal Accidents theory, and 
justify why it is an appropriate and strong theoretical framework to analyze the Sony 
Pictures hack crisis. 
 Perrow (1999) identifies that systems that are prone to these normal accidents are 
‘complex’ systems; meaning, they are systems that consist of a multitude of variables that 
could find themselves interconnected with one another out of sequence. These complex 
systems differ greatly to their counterpart, linear systems, seeing as they do not operate in 
a sequential (e.g., conveyer belt) mode of operation (Perrow, 2011). Linear systems are 
identified as simple systems, compared to complex systems, as they can easily substitute 
or replace any supplies and equipment during the occurrence of an accident, due to their 
extensive availability. They accomplish this because of their “assembly line-like” 
operational design. This allows for ease of maintenance and minimal disturbance to the 
remainder of the system if a crisis were to occur during a malfunction of one component. 
The variables in complex systems are known as subsystems - multiple moving parts 
within the system that individually play a significant role to produce the overall system’s 
final product. These subsystems can also be interdependent to where the malfunction of 
one has the potential to impact the status of the other. Therefore, complex systems are 
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usually referred to as ‘high-risk’ systems (e.g. chemical plants, aircraft carriers, and 
nuclear plants).  
These high-risk systems are complex because they consist of specialized 
personnel and subsystems that are highly interactive with one another to accomplish their 
system’s agenda (Perrow, 1967; 1984; 1999; and 2011). Although, complex systems 
contain highly interactive subsystems, ‘complex interactions’ are usually “unfamiliar 
sequences, or unplanned and unexpected sequences, and either not visible or not 
immediately comprehensible” (Perrow, 1999, p. 78). They are complex interactions 
because they occur outside of the organization’s normal production sequence between 
two subsystems that are known to be unrelated in the system’s original design and 
operation.  
 Thus, understanding the composition of a complex system and how it operates, 
and the potentiality of complex interactions grants communication scholars a stronger 
grasp on how to better diagnose a crisis that could happen within a similar organization. 
As noted by Coombs and Holladay (1996), “characteristics of the crisis situation should 
suggest to the crisis manager the best crisis response strategy or strategies to fit the 
situation” (p. 284). For example, the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant in 
1978 highlighted how the malfunction of one subsystem (condensate polisher) impacted 
the malfunction of another subsystem (feed water pumps), and finally the failure of the 
major subsystem (pilot-operated relief valve); which ultimately lead to the release of 
radioactive gases into the environment (Perrow, 1999). From this example, crisis 
communication scholars can diagnose and later identify the interactive complexity within 
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the system across its subsystems to suggest a crisis management plan grounded in human 
intervention. 
 This human intervention is imperative in both the pre-crisis and crisis phase 
during a normal accident in these high-risk systems. As Perrow (1999) notes, “normal 
accidents stem from the mysterious interaction of failures, those closest to the system, the 
operators, have to be able to take independent and sometimes quite creative action” (p. 
10). This “operator action”, as Perrow puts it, is communicative at its core seeing as 
multiple operators exist across various subsystems that have the potential of interacting. 
Thus, the intervention or ‘action” produced by the operator in response to the first 
subsystem’s failure during a crisis must be quickly and effectively communicated to other 
operators across the system. Or, as Perrow (1999) suggests, “the communication must be 
exact, the dial correct, the switch position obvious, the reading direct, and on-line” (p. 
84). Other operators overseeing related subsystems must be made aware of the primary 
subsystem’s malfunction promptly to prevent the failure of their subsystem. To 
accomplish this, a crisis communication strategy that accounts for the possibility of these 
accidents occurring must be in place for operators to be aware of how they should 
intervene and who they should be contacting as the crisis unfolds. Normal Accidents 
theory provides insight into how these ‘mysterious’ failures may occur in a complex 
system, shedding light on the system’s high-riskiness based on its interactive complexity. 
This interconnectivity is known as coupling. 
Coupling is the degree of interconnectedness between components within a 
system (Weick, 1976, 1982; Orton & Weick, 1990;  and Perrow, 1984, 1999, 2011). 
There exists two degrees of coupling – loose and tight. The looseness or tightness of 
  12 
coupling is the strength of the connection between two subsystems (Perrow, 2011). 
Weick (1976) was the first to introduce the notion of coupling when he referred to 
educational organizations as loosely coupled systems. A loosely coupled system is one 
that contains subsystems that are aware of each other’s role but operate primarily in 
isolation from one another (Burke, 2014; Green & Swanson, 2011; Perrow, 1984; 1999; 
2011; and Weick, 1976; 1982). Loosely coupled systems have the advantage that 
disruptions in one subsystem do not necessarily hinder the overall system’s operational 
goal. Loosely coupled systems allow for various system components to operate freely 
under their own interests without consequence of impacting another component within 
the system. As Perrow (1999) notes, “loosely coupled systems tend to have ambiguous or 
perhaps flexible performance standards, and they may have little consumer monitoring, 
so the absence of the intended connection can remain unobserved” (p. 91). Thus, the 
pressure to ensure that all components within a system operate exactly as required is 
minimal in loosely coupled systems; because the end product’s creation is not dependent 
on the precision in connection between components. However, the downfall of loosely 
coupled systems is that they are not as efficient and have slower response time due to the 
weak interconnectivity across the system. 
Tight coupling, “is a mechanical term meaning there is no slack or buffer or give 
between two items” (Perrow, 1999, p.90). Tight coupling is more prominent in extremely 
high-risk, complex systems that have greater potential for catastrophic consequence in 
result of a crisis. According to Weick (1976), tightly coupled systems carry four specific 
criteria: 1) clearly defined rules; 2) organizational members agree on rules; 3) outcomes 
from rules are clearly defined and a specific procedure is in place to identify when they 
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are met; and 4) feedback loops are in place to verify the success of the system. He 
stresses that what differentiates a tightly coupled system from a loosely coupled system is 
a lack of agreement on a clearly defined process or rule. 
 Perrow (1999) expands on the four categories considering high-risk, complex 
systems: 1) time dependent processes; 2) system sequences are invariant; 3) production 
goal can only be reached one way; and 4) the system has little to no slack. Meaning, the 
failure of one component results in a direct and quick change within another component. 
Tight coupling makes for precision in process between subsystems as one relies on the 
other for the final product to be produced correctly. A tightly coupled system does not 
allow for various components to behave independently for its own agenda. Instead a 
tightly coupled system is time-dependent and job-dependent, to where each component 
must meet its assigned task in its scheduled time to ensure the successful operation of all 
connected components within the system, and the accurate creation of the final product. 
For example, a processing plant operates through tight coupling due to it being required 
to alter its processes for market demands. This change in processes requires operators to 
proceed quickly so that these changes are noted, reported, and executed with efficiency. 
By contrast, if a processing plant were loosely coupled these changes in one component 
would not be met with swift changes in another, and would result in inefficiencies 
(Perrow, 1984; 1999; 2011).  
Tightly coupled systems must be prompt in response to any distresses that may 
occur to avoid disastrous consequences. However, tightly coupled systems cannot 
incorporate substitutive aid in response to failure as there is no slack in the system for 
such input. Instead, these buffers or substitutions are designed-in as part of the system 
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from its inception. These designed-in aids increase the complexity of the system and 
cannot always account for interactivity between subsystems that is unexpected. Hence, 
Normal Accidents theory highlights how some failures that occur within the complex 
systems are unexpected and can then result in full-blown catastrophes. The complex 
interactions of a system are those that occur in an “unfamiliar and unexpected sequence 
that is not visible or immediately comprehensible” (Perrow, 1999, p. 78). This complex 
interactivity increases because of the tightly coupled and intricate design of the system 
that is meant to account for all possibilities. Organizations then assume that the more 
controls, guidelines, and procedures in place decrease the likelihood of an accident. 
However, Normal Accidents theory suggests the exact opposite. This heightened 
complexity in design and security increases the likelihood of unexpected interactions that 
can exist between subsystems. This increase in interactions complicates the system 
leading to unexpected sequences of failures during an accident that afterwards become a 
catastrophe, and in turn a crisis. The following section discusses in detail the intricacies 
related to complex organizations. 
Complex Organizations 
Much of Normal Accidents Theory highlights almost exclusively complex 
systems that are technologically advanced and high-risk (e.g. chemical plants, nuclear 
plants, air craft carriers, etc.). Many scholars have criticized Perrow for his over-
emphasis on technology’s role within normal accidents; identifying it as ‘technological 
determinism’ (see: Le Coze, 2015). Perrow himself highlights in his writing that rooted in 
his thesis of normal accidents is that technological advancements have become engrained 
in systems making them highly complex. Though technology is a prominent theme in 
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normal accidents, it does not erase the role that human behavior and intervention play 
within complex systems. Vaughan (1996) expands normal accidents theory beyond just 
technological determinism, and notes that the coexistence of technology and human 
action can be present within complex systems. He highlights that accidents can occur via 
the interaction of both technological mishaps and social forces: ‘complex and dynamic 
techno-social coupling’ (Coze, 2015, p.277; and Vaughan, 1996). Therefore, normal 
accidents do not only occur considering the complexity surrounding the system’s 
advanced technology, but can occur due to the complexity of the system’s social patterns. 
Thus, to qualify as a complex system there is no obligation to being only a 
technologically high-risk system. Universities, major business corporations, and 
government agencies serve as complex systems. These systems do not operate in linear 
interactions, where sequences are familiar and expected, even visible when unplanned. 
Thus, they are complex in the sense that various sub-systems within the overall system 
have the potential to reach one another unexpectedly through various means of 
interaction. Moreover, the looseness and tightness in coupling within such a complex 
system are not mutually exclusive. As one system can include both loose and tight 
subsystems within its infrastructure (Green & Swanson, 2011). 
These complex systems are not strictly technologically advanced, high-risk 
systems either, but can be multifaceted organizations; for example: public schools, 
universities, or multi-departmental companies (Fusarelli, 2002; Perrow, 1991; Weick, 
1982). This is key to note, in relation to this study, as SPE is a multi-departmental 
production company that operates as a complex system. Unexpected interactions within a 
multifaceted organization can occur between various departments against the system’s 
  16 
overall mission and result in a crisis (Fusarelli, 2002; Green & Swanson, 2011; Lutz, 
1982; Perrow 1999; and Weick, 1976; 1982). These various departments serve as the 
organization’s subsystems through the people that operate within them. Similar to a pump 
in the turbine building of a nuclear plant, particular employees within a specific 
department constitute that subsystem. For example, the disturbance in the payroll 
department directly impacts other employee behavior, the goals of the organization, and 
ultimately its output (Weick, 1982). Leadership must be able to juggle these various 
demands and goals made of its organization, both the internal (across departments) and 
external (stakeholders), to maintain cohesion and prevent any organizational failure from 
happening that could lead to a potential crisis (Spender & Grinyer, 1995).  
Perrow (1961) discusses the importance of goals in complex organizations. 
Perrow distinguishes between “official goals” and “operative goals”. He notes that 
official goals are the general-purpose statements made by organizations to fulfill its 
legitimacy as an organization. Operative goals are the underlying tactics that are put in 
place and used to achieve the official goals. For example, if the organization’s official 
goal is to provide exceptional customer service, then its operative goal could be to ensure 
that 90% of its customer base averages a 4/5 in customer satisfaction on the customer exit 
survey. Operative goals allow organizations to operationalize how they are going to 
achieve their official goals through measurable means. Thus, understanding the operative 
goals of a complex organization allows for the organization to operate in line with 
fulfilling its intended output. Though official and operative goals have been noted in the 
literature regarding complex organizations; the interconnectivity of goals between two 
differing complex organizations has not, nor is it accounted for in Normal Accidents 
  17 
theory or the literature surrounding complex organizations. Yet, it is worthy of notice to 
clearly understand the inner workings of complex organizations and their operations, and 
be able to identify the complexity of SPE as a system. 
Summary 
Since SPE meets the criteria of a multi-faceted organization, and thus, a complex 
system, Normal Accidents theory will be used as a theoretical lens to understand the 
organization’s complexity and interconnectivity to shed light on how its 2014 hack crisis 
transpired and later became a national security crisis. 
 In sum, a “normal accident” is an inevitable phenomenon in complexly interactive 
systems. Since it is inevitable, we as communication scholars must identify means to 
address these accidents as an extension of the organization’s normalcy without allowing 
them to manifest into crises through effective and proactive crisis management tactics. 
This type of crisis management is possible through increased insight on how the overall 
system and its sub-systems operate, and how human intervention can be taken in 
instances of interactive system malfunction. The interactions between subsystems within 
the system are found to be unexpected sequences that are not seen nor understood upon 
their happening. The more complex the system, the more likely that a miniscule incident 
may become catastrophic, due to the strong interdependency of its variables.  
Rationale 
 It is evident through Normal Accidents theory how an unanticipated connection 
between two independent and unrelated subsystems can occur through nonlinear 
interactions (Perrow, 2011). In Normal Accidents theory, these two subsystems are 
related to one major complex system, where a change in one results in a change in the 
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other, and ultimately affects the system as a whole. This interaction of unexpected 
sequences is due to the complexity of the system and the coupling between subsystems. 
 However, research utilizing Normal Accidents theory as the central point of 
analysis to explain the manifestation of an accident and crisis through the interaction 
between two independent and unrelated major, complex systems does not exist. 
Therefore, the following study serves as important research showcasing Normal 
Accidents theory’s versatility in explaining this phenomenon. In the following chapter, I 
highlight the methodology of this study and how I used case study analysis to fill this gap 
in research and understand this interaction between two independent complex systems – 
Sony Pictures Entertainment and the U.S. Federal Government. Also, in the next chapter, 
I detail how Normal Accidents theory was used as a theoretical lens to analyze the Sony 
Pictures hack crisis. 
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CHAPTER III - METHODOLOGY 
The current gap in the organizational and crisis communication literature utilizing 
Normal Accidents theory to understanding the interconnectedness between systems and 
how one organization’s crisis leads to its interaction with a separate organization, and the 
creation of an additional organizational crisis mandates an in-depth examination of this 
phenomenon. In this study, I used case study analysis as the primary method to 
understand how and why the Sony Pictures 2014 hack crisis lead to an interaction with 
the United States Federal Government, which then created a national security crisis. 
Throughout the analysis of the case, I used Normal Accidents theory as the guiding lens 
to examine the case, its events, and the communicative underpinnings that established the 
interaction between each organization. In this chapter, I first explain what case study 
analysis is and the type of case study design that was conducted. Second, I justify why 
case study analysis is the strongest methodology of choice for this study. Third, I provide 
details on the data collection process. Finally, I discuss how the data was analyzed. 
This study posed the following research question: 
How did the normal accident within one system (SPE) cause an accident within a 
separate system (U.S Federal Government) and later transpire into a national security 
crisis. 
Case Study Analysis 
 Case study analysis is a thorough examination of a phenomenon using various 
types of evidence to explore and gain an in-depth understanding of that phenomenon. Yin 
(2013) notes that case study is a form of research that allows researchers to “understand 
complex social phenomena and gain a holistic and real-world perspective” (p. 674). The 
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strength and popularity of case study analysis is it provides focus in gaining depth of 
knowledge pertaining to a specific ‘case’ by placing boundaries to avoid too broad of 
study. The ‘case’ is that which serves as the object of analysis or “phenomenon occurring 
in a bounded context” (p. 25). Daymon and Holloway (2010) emphasize that case studies 
are “intensive examination(s), using multiple sources of evidence, of a single entity [case] 
which is bound by time and place” (p. 105). Other researchers highlight that the case can 
be bound by time and activity (Stake, 1995), or definition and context (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). For the purposes of this research, the case was bound by time and 
place: Sony Pictures Entertainment (SPE) hack crisis, November 24th, 2014 – January 2nd, 
2015. 
 Based on the typology of case studies introduced by Yin (2003), in this study an 
“explanatory case study using a single case study design” was employed to analyze the 
SPE hack crisis. An explanatory case study is “a type of case study used to answer a 
question to explain the presumed causal links in real-life interventions” (Baxter & Jack, 
2008, p. 547). This explanatory case study reveals the communicative casual links 
between the two organizations to explain how a crisis in one organization caused a 
separate organization’s crisis.  
The SPE hack crisis as a case meets Yin’s (2013) single case study design 
rationales – 1) unusual circumstance and 2) testing an existing theory. Thus, the single 
case study design is used to analyze the SPE hack crisis as an unusual circumstance – a 
phenomenon that is peculiar, deviates, and contrasts with theoretical norms. Also, it tests 
an existing theory – Normal Accidents theory – to ensure that the theory is stable in 
accounting for SPE’s organizational accident. Additionally, the single case study design 
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offers a “deep, narrow exploration” that granted a “detailed, descriptive, and holistic 
view” of the case (Daymon & Hollaway, 2002, p. 108).  
Ultimately, the case study analysis was fitting for this study in that it provided 
depth of understanding on the SPE hack crisis as an unusual case that tested Normal 
Accidents theory, while explaining how two separate organizations interacted during the 
crisis of one. In the next section, I expound on why the case study analysis served as the 
best method of choice for this study. 
Why Case Study Analysis?  
Crisis communication research focuses on how entities use various 
communication strategies to respond to crisis, specifically how communication plays a 
role in their pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis handlings. To accomplish this research goal, 
crisis communication studies adopt case study analysis as a method of choice to “collect 
‘rich’, detailed information across a wide range of dimensions about one particular case 
or a small number of cases” (Daymon & Holloway, 2002, p.106) pertaining to the crisis 
in study (see: Coombs & Holladay, 2011; Seeger, 2006; Sellnow & Littlefield, 2005; 
Ulmer, 2001; Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000). 
Case study analysis in the crisis communication arena is used to “increase 
knowledge about real, contemporary communication events in their context” (Daymon & 
Holloway, 2010, p. 105). The SPE hack crisis is a real and contemporary communication 
event that serves as a unique case in connection to risk, crisis, and organizational 
communication. Thus, a purposeful methodology must be employed to uncover and 
understand the “many different influences and aspects of communication relationships 
and experiences” that exist within this crisis (Daymon & Hollaway, 2010, p. 106). Case 
  22 
study analysis serves this purpose as it is designed to answer the “how” and “why” 
questions related to a social phenomenon (Yin, 2013). Through its descriptive and 
interpretive functions, it sheds light on the various complexities that control the 
communicative aspects that make the case unique (Daymon & Hollaway, 2002; and 
Sellnow & Littlefield, 2005). Therefore, in this study, to understand how the Sony 
Pictures hack crisis came to be and why it interacted with the U.S. Federal Government 
to create a national security crisis, case study analysis was employed to, as noted by 
Daymon & Holloway (2010), “bring to life the nuances of managed communication by 
describing a chunk of reality . . . and attempt to offer insights that have wider relevance” 
(p. 106). These nuances are uncovered, in case study research, by gathering multiple 
kinds of evidence that are pieced together to describe and explain the case. 
 More importantly, the case study analysis is a strong methodological choice 
because it has the advantage of being able to utilize and navigate various types of 
evidence to establish a thorough examination of the case. As Yin (2003) notes, “the case 
study is preferred when examining contemporary events, but when the relevant behaviors 
cannot be manipulated … the case study’s unique strength is its ability to deal with a full 
variety of evidence — documents, artifacts, interviews, and observations” (p. 861). 
Seeing as the SPE hack crisis is a contemporary event that has already happened, the 
researcher could not manipulate any behaviors (i.e., experiment) or be on sight (i.e., 
observational study) to gather data as the case occurred. Therefore, the researcher relied 
on existing evidence from multiple sources of information and multiple viewpoints to 
understand the case as a communication crisis event. Baxter and Jack (2008) emphasize 
the strength behind gathering multiple sources in that “each data source is one piece of 
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the “puzzle,” each piece contributing to the understanding of the whole. This 
convergence adds strength to the findings as various strands of data braided together 
promote a greater understanding of the case” (p. 554). In the next section, I discuss how 
the evidence was gathered and what type of evidence was analyzed in this study 
Data Collection  
 To gain a holistic understanding of the Sony Pictures hack crisis, I used multiple 
data sources that covered an array of multiple viewpoints to enhance the credibility of the 
data gathered (Yin, 2013). These multiple data sources were utilized to triangulate the 
data for a more accurate examination of the crisis event (Efthimiou, 2010).  
For the purposes of this study, the data was collected from public communication, 
various media outlets (e.g., magazines and newspapers), documented interviews, Sony 
Pictures official statements, and documents authored by the United States Government. 
Specifically, the sources reviewed included news articles released between November 
24th, 2014 – January 2nd, 2015 from different publications and outlets. The articles were 
compiled from the LexisNexis database by searching the following key terms related to 
the event: Sony Pictures, Sony Pictures hack, the interview, and North Korea hack on 
Sony pictures. Internal communication from Sony Pictures Entertainment as well as the 
United States Federal Government related to the incident – newsletters, bulletins, official 
statements, presidential orders, company emails, etc. – that were available for public 
record were also gathered via these various publications. Finally, corroborated interviews 
of Sony Pictures’ employees and government officials were also utilized to analyze the 
case. Through this collection of multiple sources of evidence, I created an intensive 
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examination of the Sony Pictures hack crisis, and explanation for how it unfolded and 
why it interacted with the U.S. Federal Government to form a national security crisis.  
Selection of Sources 
 To piece a definitive compilation of the case, I selected government-direct 
statements and major American news outlets that covered the SPE hack diligently 
throughout its occurrence and at its end. A total of nine sources were used to build the 
case: six major news sources and three government-direct documents. The six news 
sources included: The New York Times, Time Inc.’s FORTUNE, CNN, NBC News, and 
Vanity Fair. In addition to being America’s elite news sources, these sources included a 
variety of information to build their coverage. Rather than being a mere summary of the 
hack’s happenings, these news sources included: interviews with SPE leadership and 
employees, SPE direct emails, government officials’ statements, SPE official company 
statements and bulletins, and FBI commentary for a cohesive and factual representation 
of the SPE hack. The three government-direct documents included: White House Press 
Releases, Department of State Press Release, and Department of Homeland Security 
Press Release. These releases all included commentary from the at-time President of the 
United States, Barack Obama, at-time United States Secretary of State, John Kerry, and 
at-time United States Secretary of Homeland Security Jet Johnson. These news outlets 
and government documents were selected as they all contained direct narrative from SPE 
officials and government officials who were involved during the crisis. The nine total 
sources allowed for a holistic understanding of the SPE hack internally, its interactivity 
with the U.S. Federal Government, and its later evolution to a national security crisis. 
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Selection of Timeline  
A time period of six weeks, from November 24th, 2014 to January 2nd, 2015 was 
selected for the examination and building of this case. The following is a description of 
key dates within the timeline. On November 24th, the cyber hackers – Guardians of the 
Peace (GOP) accessed and hijacked SPE’s computer database and server via malware 
sent through email. Nov. 25th, SPE contacted the FBI and cyber-security firms to assist 
with containing and fixing the hack and its damages. Dec. 2nd, SPE’s CEO Michael 
Lynton and Co-Chairperson Amy Pascal publicly confirmed the severity of the company-
wide hack to the entirety of SPE. Dec 2nd – Dec. 4th, the GOP released multiple “data 
dumps” where thousands of SPE’s private personnel information, emails, and production 
data were leaked and shared with the public via various internet sites. Dec. 8th, GOP 
confirmed that the film, The Interview was the reason for the hack and demanded that it 
be removed from theaters. Dec. 8th – Dec. 15th, GOP released more confidential personnel 
information, emails, and SPE production content. Dec. 16th, the GOP threatened a “9/11 
type” terrorist attack against all the theaters that showed The Interview. Dec. 16th – 18th, 
theaters cancel The Interview from showing. Dec. 19th, FBI confirmed that North Korea 
was responsible for the attack. Dec. 19th, at-time government officials, President Barack 
Obama, Secretary of State John Kerry, and Secretary of Homeland Security Jet Johnson 
all gave public statements regarding the cyber-attack, SPE’s decision, and North Korea’s 
involvement. Dec. 24th, SPE released The Interview digitally on select, online video-
streaming platforms. Jan. 2nd, at-time president Barack Obama signed an executive order 
that installed additional sanctions against North Korea in response to the hack and its 
damages. 
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November 24th, 2014 is used as the starting point for this study as it marks the day 
that the GOP made threatening contact with SPE. Although, there are some reports that 
indicated that a cryptic “warning” was made to SPE much earlier in June 2014 from an 
unknown source; November 24th also served as the date that the hackers made initial 
access into SPE’s database, and will therefore be used as the starting point for this case. 
January 2nd, 2015 will serve as the case’s end point as it marks the day President Barack 
Obama released an executive order that imposed additional sanctions against North 
Korea. Also, by that time The Interview had already been released digitally by SPE and 
seen both nationally and internationally by viewers. In the coming section, I provide an 
explanation for how the data was analyzed using a descriptive case study method, which 
includes theoretical proposition’s analysis strategy via the explanation building analytic 
technique.  
Data Analysis 
Yin (2002) defines a case study as “a contemporary phenomenon within its real-
life context, especially when the boundaries between a phenomenon and context are not 
clear and the researcher has little control over the phenomenon and context” (p. 13). 
Several approaches to analyzing data within case study research exist. The present study 
uses a descriptive case study method. This approach stresses “prior development of 
theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis” (Yin, 2002, pp. 13-14). 
Thus, “Yin emphasizes the necessity that researchers review the relevant literature and 
include theoretical propositions regarding the case under study before starting to conduct 
any data collection, which distinguishes it from such methodologies as grounded theory 
and ethnography” (Yazan, 2015, p. 140). Merriam (1998) explains that case studies can 
  27 
use purposive sampling to identify the best evidence that highlights the theoretical 
concepts under scrutiny. Using this approach, case study research is highly descriptive 
and does not require a more formal content analysis using coding of units of analysis into 
themes. Rather, the criterion for assessing the validity of the analysis is how closely the 
“best” evidence represents the concepts as established in the review of literature. If the 
concepts have been clearly articulated and the supporting materials, often presented from 
several sources, undoubtedly exemplify those concepts, then the argument for validity 
should be strong. Data is evaluated in terms of its evidentiary and explanatory value 
(Yazan, 2015).  
Analysis of the evidence to build the case study relies heavily on the 
conceptualizations of the relevant concepts and draws upon the review of the associated 
literature. Therefore, the scholarly literature is incorporated throughout the study in a 
manner that might be uncommon to other methods. The investigator “[draws] 
systematically from previous knowledge and [cuts] down on misperception” (Stake, 
1995, p. 72); concurrently, he or she “gives precedence to intuition and impression rather 
than guidance of the protocol” (Yazan, 2015, p. 145). It is incumbent on the researcher 
and reader to “[know] what leads to significant understanding, [recognize] good sources 
of data, and consciously and unconsciously [test] out the veracity of their eyes and 
robustness of their interpretations. It requires sensitivity and skepticism” (Stake, 1995, p. 
50).  
 Additionally, Normal Accidents theory’s theoretical propositions were used to 
guide the understanding of the case study (Yin, 2013). Normal Accidents theory’s 
propositions were used to identify conditions for explanations on the case being 
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examined. This descriptive case study allowed the researcher to link the case to concepts 
specific to theory; which provided a sense of direction for how the data should be 
analyzed (Yin, 2013). Additionally, the technique used in conjunction with this 
descriptive case study is known as - explanation building – analyzing the case by building 
an explanation for the case itself (Yin, 2013). Specifically, explanation building entails 
identifying causal links to make sense of why and how the case unfolded in the manner 
that it did. Also, to avoid any potential problems related to explanation building as an 
analytic technique, the explanations created reflect the propositions identified in Normal 
Accidents theory. 
Theoretical Propositions 
The following are Normal Accidents Theory’s theoretical propositions that were 
used to guide the explanation building technique during the case analysis of this study: 
Systems. “Systems are divided into [at least] four levels of increasing aggregation: 
units, parts, subsystem, and system” (Perrow, 1999, p.70). 
Complex Systems. “Systems that contain many interactions that require control, 
and information about the state of components or processes that is more indirect and 
inferential” (Perrow, 1999, p.83). 
Accidents. “Damage to subsystems or the system as a whole, stopping the 
intended output or affecting it to the extent that it must be halted promptly” (Perrow, 
1999, p.70). 
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System Accidents. “Unanticipated interaction of multiple failures” (Perrow, 1999, p.70). 
Linear Interactions. “Expected and familiar production or maintenance sequence, and 
those that are quite visible even if unplanned” (Perrow, 1999, p.78). 
Complex Interactions. “Unfamiliar sequences or unplanned and unexpected sequences, 
and either not visible or not immediately comprehensible. (Perrow, 1999, p.78). 
Loose Coupled Systems. Systems where the interactivity between subsystems are not 
dependent upon each other, allow for buffer, and adjustments to be made leniently. 
Tightly Coupled Systems. Systems where interactivity between subsystems is very strict 
and contains no slack. These systems contain all buffers built-in and do not allow for 
adjustments or leniency during operation. 
 These theoretical propositions were used to guide the descriptive case study 
analysis to ensure that a critical and valid explanation of the case was built. Moreover, 
Normal Accidents theory was expanded to include additional propositions that accounted 
for the interactivity between two separate, major complex systems during an accident of 
one. Ultimately, this study’s results for the Sony Pictures hack crisis provide an 
explanation for how the accident unfolded, and why it later became a national security 
crisis. The following chapter describes in detail the SPE hack crisis case.  
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CHAPTER IV - CASE ANALYSIS 
 This chapter reveals the specifics of the SPE hack crisis, how it later transformed 
into a national security crisis, and describes key proponents that justify the crisis as a 
normal accident. Specifically, this chapter provides background about the SPE case, 
explores system failure, subsystem malfunction, and interconnectivity between systems 
through a timeline narrative of the case study. 
Sony Pictures Entertainment Hack: Was it really a crisis? 
 Crises are not “one-size-fits-all” but vary in type and intensity (Seeger, Sellnow, 
& Ulmer, 2003). The SPE hack can be identified as an organizational crisis – “a specific 
unexpected and non-routine organizationally based event or series of events which 
creates high levels of uncertainty and threat or perceived threat to an organization’s high 
priority goals” (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 1998, p. 233) induced by an act of cyber 
terrorism. In this section, I will explore the SPE hack in three phases to build the case and 
provide an analysis using Normal Accidents theory to make sense of its happenings; 
Phase 1 – saying hello: the shakedown of the SPE database, phase 2 – flirting with 
national security: confidentiality aflame, and phase 3 – it’s official: national security 
crisis over The Interview. 
Phase 1 – Saying Hello: The Shakedown of the SPE Database 
There were no warning signs for SPE before it received its first hack email that 
contained five links routing to SPE’s internal records by the hacker group identifying 
themselves as the “Guardians of Peace” on the morning of November 24th, 2014 (Elkind, 
2015, 66). The email read, “We’ve obtained all your internal data including your secrets 
and top secrets. If you don’t obey us, we’ll release data shown below to the world.” This 
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type of attack was foreign to SPE’s repertoire of crisis management and served as “a 
specific unexpected and non-routine organizationally based event” (Seeger et al., 1998, 
233). This email was the trigger event, a change in freedom to access resources of 
importance related to the organizations daily “normal” operations (Stewart, 2000), which 
lead SPE and its employees directly into the crisis stage. It served as a bifurcation point 
where the organization’s operational normalcy was shaken into an uncertain chaotic 
situation (Farazmand, 2003). SPE’s regular communication platform was at a standstill 
and at the mercy of this unexpected event. Employees did not have computer, email, or 
cellphone access, and this resulted in a shift from regular daily operations to operations of 
crisis response to regain organizational normalcy. 
 The hackers’ initial email allowed for interactivity to ensue with the SPE’s 
computer database. Regular operations using the SPE computer database company-wide 
include the sending, receiving, and opening of emails; thus, this is considered a normal 
phenomenon within the system. However, upon opening the initial hack email a complex 
interaction occurred between the hacker’s email and the SPE database. The hacker’s 
email served as one subsystem and SPE’s database served as the other subsystem. The 
two subsystems being unrelated but now connected with each other prompted the 
accident’s formation. Initially this unexpected sequence of interactivity between the 
email and the database was not visible nor immediately comprehensible (Perrow, 1984). 
It was not until SPE’s entire communication platform was shut down from the hack that 
an understanding of what was occurring began to become clear for SPE and its 
leadership. This shutdown marked the beginning of the accident in that various 
subsystems became damaged leading to a system-wide halt of output for SPE. 
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 During this portion of the crisis stage SPE is interpreting the signal (unexpected 
trigger event) and attending to its damages. Seeing as this crisis spanned over a long 
period of time its initial onset did not induce severe emotional arousal as expected in a 
traditional crisis. Initially, Amy Pascal’s (SPE at-time Co-Chairperson) reaction was that 
it had to be a joke (Seal, 2015). However, being the acting leadership amidst the crisis 
she persisted to investigate to ensure that her interpretation of the event was a plausible 
one that led to effective action (Seeger et al., 2003). Through continued communication 
leaders Pascal and Michael Lynton (SPE at-time CEO) eventually identified the 
situation’s severity, and prompted SPE to take preventive measures to reduce the 
probability of any data loss. SPE’s C.F.O, David Hendler ordered a complete shutdown 
of the SPE computer database to prevent any further damage until the gravity of the issue 
was assessed and fully resolved (Seal, 2015). 
 Phase one of the SPE hack highlights its legitimacy as a crisis as it contains an 
unexpected event that lead the organization into uncertainty and away from normalcy. 
This trigger event served as a bifurcation point upon the organization’s daily routine. This 
point shifted the organization’s way-of-life. In addition to the complete shutdown of 
SPE’s computer system, employees were instructed to disconnect from Internet access 
across all their mobile devices and computers. This shut down and disconnect Weick 
(1988) identifies as a form of enactment known as ‘safe inaction’ in interest of reaching 
an accurate diagnosis of the problem until ‘dangerous action’ can be fulfilled to fully 
resolve the crisis. Furthermore, this shift in the organization’s way-of-life and the 
disconnect from normalcy highlights a total system accident (Perrow, 1984). A system 
accident indicates multiple failures in various subsystems across one system. In this case, 
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various communication subsystems within the SPE system were forced to shut down due 
to the initial accident that was prompted by the hackers’ email. This one component 
failure lead to multiple other failures throughout SPE that began to interact in 
unanticipated ways: SPE employees being unable to access internet, communicate via 
mobile devices, complete work-related tasks via their computers. In result, other business 
ventures connected to SPE and its employees’ duties were thwarted during this timeframe 
because of the system-wide accident induced by the complex interaction of the GOP 
email and SPE’s subsystem.  
Though a system shutdown was fulfilled and SPE did not succumb to negotiating 
with terrorists at that point (Toros, 2008), phase one was only the initiation of a brewing 
national security crisis that would extend beyond SPE’s organizational borders and into 
the arms of the United States Federal Government. 
Phase Two – Flirting with National Security: Confidentiality Aflame 
In a crisis, “organizational members and the public often experience intense 
emotional arousal, stress, fear, anxiety, and apprehension” (Seeger et al., 2003, p. 9). SPE 
suffered eight information leaks throughout the hack crisis. Many of these leaks consisted 
of early movie releases via pirating websites. However, one of the eight leaks released 
confidential and personal information (i.e., Social security numbers, bank information, 
credit card information, etc.) of 47,000 Sony employees (Wagstaff, 2014). This type of 
sensitive information being released for public access via the Internet was detrimental to 
the organization’s members who were directly affected. SPE in turn had to respond 
accordingly to this massive security breach to ensure the overall safety of its employees; 
as “an organization’s first impulse should be to acknowledge those harmed and do 
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everything possible to assist them” (Seeger et al., 2003, p. 131). The leadership 
immediately acknowledged the crisis and provided transparent communication for its 
employees to manage the issue accordingly. Issue management is “the strategic response 
to help organizations make adaptations needed to achieve harmony” (Heath, 1997, p. 3). 
Pascal and Lynton sent a memo to all employees that served as a strategic response for 
issue management: 
It is now apparent that a large amount of confidential Sony Pictures Entertainment 
data has been stolen by the cyber attackers, including personnel information and 
business documents. This is the result of a brazen attack on our company, our 
employees and our business partners. This theft of Sony materials and the release 
of employee and other information are malicious criminal acts, and we are 
working closely with law enforcement . . . While we are not yet sure of the full 
scope of information that the attackers have or might release, we unfortunately 
have to ask you to assume that information about you in the possession of the 
company might be in their possession. While we would hope that common 
decency might prevent disclosure, we of course cannot assume that . . . We can’t 
overemphasize our appreciation to all of you for your extraordinary hard work, 
commitment and resolve. (Peterson, 2014, p. 1)  
Additionally, the FBI as well as multiple cyber-security firms were sought out to assist in 
solving the crisis at hand (Seal, 2015). Though Sony was not responsible for the leaks 
that occurred, since they were acts of terrorism, it was in fact responsible for its 
employees. It is the role of the organization to take responsibility in reducing the intense 
emotional and psychological stress that is experienced by its members (Seeger et al., 
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2003). Moreover, SPE’s employees not only suffered “emotional and psychological” 
stress but they suffered damages towards their livelihoods, as one SPE employee, who 
wanted to remain anonymous, stated in an interview with Fortune magazine:  
Things became more clear when it was revealed what information was released. 
Around Wednesday or Thursday, people started saying: call your bank, change 
your passwords, set up a new checking account. I was completely irate. Once it 
got personal, it was just, are you kidding me? Seeing the faces of colleagues with 
families—they’re worried about their life savings, their retirement funds, their 
kids. (Marikar, 2014, p. 1). 
In turn, SPE had to conduct healing, particularly to build a new foundation for its 
employees’ overall security. SPE accepted responsibility for the consequences suffered 
by its employees and put together positive and progressive measures to overcome and 
establish stability for its victims (Seeger & Ulmer, 2001).  
 Interestingly, many large corporations such as SPE have state of the art cyber 
protection at their disposal that is specifically designed to be the main line of defense for 
these types of hacks. As Perrow (1984) notes, complex systems have built-in safety 
designs that are designed with the sole purpose to prevent failure. However, it is these 
elaborate designs that make the system complex, if not more complex, and more difficult 
to navigate through during an accident; and that is where SPE failed in its intervention 
post the initial hack. Once the hack began to release confidential information of SPE 
employees, the rationale of technological-determinism for the crises’ inception falls short. 
As Vaughan (1996) highlights, in his expansion of Normal Accidents theory from a 
technological-deterministic theory to a techno-social theory - human intervention plays a 
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role in the unfolding of accidents, and in Sony’s case, crises. Upon receiving the initial 
scare of a system-wide shut down by the hackers, SPE leadership should have intervened 
(e.g., social action) accordingly to prevent any further damage from taking place, and 
lives being negatively impacted. This turning point is similar to Vaughan’s (1996) 
example of the Challenger normal accident: “no fundamental decisions were made at 
NASA to do evil, rather, a series of rather seemingly decisions were made that 
incrementally moved the space agency toward a catastrophic outcome’ (p. 410). There 
was no intention from SPE leadership to allow the hackers’ continued damage to SPE; 
yet, its lack of prompt change in behavior in response to the initial hack was the decision 
that moved SPE to catastrophic outcomes internally (e.g., company and employees), and 
catalyzed its coupling with the U.S. Federal Government. 
 The leadership of an organization has extensive power when it comes to decision 
making especially during times of crisis (Le Coze, 2015). However, as Perrow (1986) 
highlights, “organizations are tools in the hands of their leaders, but they are imperfect, 
not completely controlled, tools, and it is a struggle to maintain control over them (p. 
134). This is evident when SPE leadership assumed they were making the right decision 
for the organization considering the initial hack. Its inability to control the happenings 
within its own organization emphasizes the struggle that it takes to contain an accident 
when it occurs within a system, if action is not taken quickly and appropriately. This is 
because organizations are susceptible to their environments and are later shaped by them, 
while also shaping the environment in return; a true interconnectivity between the 
organization and external world (Perrow, 1986). Due to the lack of successful 
intervention by SPE leadership, the entire organization became altered by the accident, 
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and later the happenings within the organization transferred externally onto society 
altering the nation’s security and creating a separate crisis. 
Phase Three – It’s Official: National Security Crisis for The Interview 
The GOP followed through on each of its cyber threats with precise and 
destructive action. Initially, this cyber-attack was limited to the boundaries of the SPE 
organization. However, upon leakage of confidential and personal employee information, 
the tides turned, and the extent of the aggressor’s capabilities became evident and 
tangible. Thus, SPE was faced with the challenge of responding to the situation 
accordingly based on the newfound intensity and seriousness of the situation, while still 
being open to its developing uncertainty. The seriousness of the situation had begun to 
increase and it became clear to SPE that the initial crisis had spiraled into something 
beyond its control; and thus, its responses had to become equally as sensitive to the new 
extremity of the situation (Seeger et al., 2003). Henceforth, SPE’s response became 
communicating the need for assistance from the Federal Government. The Federal 
Government’s subsystem – the FBI – provided its assistance in assessing and containing 
the hack to the best of its abilities. 
 This integration of the Federal Government’s expertise can be attributed to the 
phenomenon known as the transformation process. The transformation process, as Perrow 
(1984) explains, is the redesign of a system through the addition of operator experience to 
reduce the possibility of interactions that are likely to cause an accident. In this case, the 
assistance from the Federal Government serves as the addition of operator experience. Its 
role was to identify how the hackers could access SPE in aim of reducing this 
interactiveness to avoid further coupling, accidents, and future crises. The Federal 
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Government brings experience that is rooted in its training against other national security 
threats, which in turn transformed how the SPE crisis was ultimately handled. The 
Federal Government’s expertise increased the knowledge needed to resolve the problem, 
seeing as SPE was unable to fix it internally. Additionally, and important to note for this 
study, this integration of the Federal Government’s expertise serves as the initiation point 
for the between-systems interaction. Because not only is the Federal Government 
providing its expertise, it is incorporating its relevant subsystems to assist in the 
containment of the SPE accident. This between-systems interaction is to avoid further 
impact from the SPE accident onto the Federal Government’s organization and its 
stakeholders – the American people and their livelihood and security. 
 Amidst all this terror it was still unclear to SPE as to why they were being 
targeted and why this was happening. Also, during this time SPE continued as planned to 
release its movie The Interview on Christmas day. The Interview is a political satire that 
revolves around the assassination of North Korean Supreme Leader, Kim Jong-Un, which 
at the time was speculated (later confirmed) to be the catalyst for the cyber-attacks. 
However, SPE never confirmed a connection between the cyber-attacks and the The 
Interview, nor was it ever made known by the attackers to be the underlying reason for its 
attacks. It was not until early December when an email from the GOP connected its 
destruction to reason: 
Stop immediately showing the movie of terrorism which can break the regional 
peace and cause the War! You, SONY & FBI, cannot find us. We are perfect as 
much [sic]. (Seal, 2015, p. 4) 
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The GOP reign of terrorism had, through explicit and targeted communication - “FBI 
cannot find us”, bifurcated beyond the walls of SPE and into the hands of the United 
States Government. 
In this moment, a “plausible explanation for the event” (Seeger et al., 2003, p. 
127) was established and reasoning for this multi-level crisis was clear. Upon demanding 
the removal of The Interview, the crisis became less targeted on the destabilization of the 
SPE organization and more of an attack on the United States’ guiding principles, 
particularly the first amendment – American freedom of speech. It sparked the attention 
and action of major political figures. At-time Secretary of Homeland Security, Jet 
Johnson stated: 
The cyber-attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment was not just an attack 
against a company and its employees. It was also an attack on our freedom of 
expression and way of life. (Johnson, 2014, p. 1) 
Furthermore, GOP followed up its demand with ultimatums identifying what would 
happen if the removal of The Interview did not commence: 
We will clearly show it to you at the very time and places. The Interview be 
shown, including the premiere, how bitter fate those who seek fun in terror should 
be doomed to. Soon all the world will see what an awful movie Sony Pictures 
Entertainment has made. The world will be full of fear. Remember the 11th of 
September 2001. We recommend you to keep yourself distant from the places at 
that time. If your house is nearby, you’d better leave. Whatever comes in the 
coming days is called by the greed of Sony Pictures Entertainment. All the world 
will denounce the SONY. (Cieply & Barnes, 2014, p. 4) 
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The GOP homed in on the United States’ familiarity with crisis intensity (e.g., September 
11th) to convey the severity of what may happen if its demands were not met. Though the 
Federal Government was not at the forefront of communication with the terrorists, this 
had still become an instance of terrorist negotiation with SPE being at the helm. 
Due to these threats to attack any theater that showed The Interview, many 
theaters across the United States cancelled their showings and opted out of showing the 
movie indefinitely (Cieply & Barnes, 2014). Afterwards SPE cancelled its Christmas day 
theatrical release of The Interview and the movie was shelved until further notice. This 
decision by SPE solidified in the eyes of the nation that the terrorists had won. It placed 
the Federal Government in a greater predicament, as it portrayed the United States as 
willing to succumb to terrorist demands, and forfeit its freedom of speech and expression. 
 This decision of compliance by SPE then prompted the involvement of the United 
States President and Secretary of State. This action taken by major political figures that 
are direct representations of the United States Government highlights the severity of the 
situation and its inadequate handling. Leadership plays a crucial role during crisis 
communication. A leader must be “visible, honest, attentive, open, and responsive during 
a crisis” (Seeger, 2003, p. 241) in terms that respond to the crisis in accordance to the 
population affected. Once again, SPE’s leadership did not react accordingly when they 
met the demands of the terrorists showing incongruence to essential American values 
(freedom of speech), and did not lead in terms of the population’s needs and values.  
Additionally, since the terrorist attack had now become a national security crisis 
the leadership had changed. Thus, the United States leadership felt required to respond 
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with immediacy to the people, and be congruent with American values and principles 
against this act of cyber terrorism. United States Secretary of State John Kerry stated: 
The United States condemns North Korea for the cyber-attack targeting Sony 
Pictures Entertainment and the unacceptable threats against movie theatres and 
moviegoers. These actions are a brazen attempt by an isolated regime to suppress 
free speech and stifle the creative expression of artists beyond the borders of its 
own country. [. . .] Freedom of expression is at the center of America’s values and 
a founding principle of our Bill of Rights. [. . .] That’s why the United States is 
and always will be a staunch advocate for and protector of the right of artists to 
express themselves freely and creatively. Whatever one’s system of government 
or views about free expression, there is absolutely no justification whatsoever for 
an attack like this. [. . .] This provocative and unprecedented attack and 
subsequent threats only strengthen our resolve to continue to work with partners 
around the world to strengthen cybersecurity, promote norms of acceptable state 
behavior, uphold freedom of expression, and ensure that the Internet 
remains open, interoperable, secure and reliable. (Kerry, 2014, p. 1) 
Shortly after, United States President, Barack Obama during his end-of-year press speech 
made the comment: 
I think Sony made a mistake. We cannot have a society in which some dictators 
someplace can start imposing censorship here in the United States because if 
somebody is able to intimidate us out of releasing a satirical movie, imagine what 
they start doing once they see a documentary that they don't like or news reports 
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that they don't like, that’s not who we are. That's not what America is about. 
(Perez, Sciutto, & Diamond, 2014, p. 1) 
These statements made by the United States leadership indicate the depth of impact of the 
crisis, its blossoming from simply being an organizational crisis to a national security 
crisis, and its severity on the nation.  
The Federal Government concluded that the North Korean Government 
spearheaded the attack. An Executive Order by President Barack Obama was issued in 
the wake of this cyber-attack that “imposed additional sanctions with respect to North 
Korea” (The White House, 2015a, p. 1). This document blocked the North Korean 
Government in dealing with “property or interests in property that are in the United 
States” (The White House, 2015a, p. 1). Furthermore, President Obama issued legislative 
proposal that would combat cyber threats and enhance cyber security (The White House, 
2015b, p. 1). 
The shift from a mere transformation process of assisting one system through the 
inclusion of another’s system’s expertise, to a secondary system accident within a 
separate system (Federal Government) occurred once the reason for the GOP’s attack was 
made evident. Identifying The Interview as the motive behind the attacks connected the 
hackers with North Korea, and its follow-up threats against the U.S. linked its behavior to 
that of full-fledged terrorism that required national security intervention.  
The U.S. Federal Government became the second system to suffer an accident at 
the hands of the GOP and the poor decision making of SPE leadership. The stripping of 
The Interview from theaters highlighted a direct attack on American values, which is a 
guiding principle in various subsystems of the Federal Government, such as the 
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Department of Homeland Security and the Secretary of State’s office. SPE’s fulfillment 
with such demands loosely coupled the two systems, as they both failed in upholding 
guiding American principles – American Freedom and refusal to negotiate with terrorists. 
This interconnectivity between two major systems, SPE and the U.S. Federal 
Government, indicates how a crisis can stem from a normal accident due to action taken 
by leadership that later leads to the halt of its intended outcome (Perrow, 1986). Once this 
transference in systems occurred, so did its leadership; and thus, the Federal Government 
took control of the response efforts in attempt to regain normalcy. This type of response 
effort from the Federal Government is unique in that the Federal Government did not 
respond to the crisis on behalf of SPE and act as a proxy communicator (Liu, 2011), 
because SPE did in fact respond to its crisis. What makes this interaction unique is that 
the Federal Government communicated for itself on its own position and on how SPE 
handled its system accident and the crisis that stemmed from it, not for SPE. Once the 
initial accident transformed into a national security crisis, the crisis response became the 
responsibility of the Federal Government in lieu of its mishandling by the initial failing 
system. In turn, the Federal Government (the second system) deployed its system 
resources and communication strategies to handle the crisis. Following, the concluding 
chapter provides further insight to this complex interaction between systems by noting 
this research’s findings, implications, limitations, and suggests directions for future 
research. 
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CHAPTER V - CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The purpose of this study was to examine the communicative underpinnings 
surrounding the SPE hack accident that later transpired into a national security crisis. The 
study was guided by the theoretical framework of Normal Accidents theory and literature 
pertaining to complex organizations. Case study analysis was employed as the primary 
mode of research to analyze the case. The results provided significant conclusions in 
sociological and risk and crisis communication scholarship. 
 This chapter presents conclusions specific to the study’s research question: 
RQ: How does the normal accident within one system (SPE) cause an accident within a 
separate system (U.S Federal Government) that later transpired into a national security 
crisis? 
 The chapter begins with conclusions related to the SPE hack as a justified crisis. I 
provide results on the SPE crisis to explain how the malfunction of one subsystem 
interacted with other subsystems to shut down an organization’s normal state of 
operation. Second, I expand the Normal Accidents theory and detail new propositions 
that help explain how two major systems interacted with one another to form an 
independent crisis. Proposition 1) common denominator and proposition 2) common goal 
are introduced, which allow Normal Accidents theory to account for the coupling 
between two independent systems (SPE & United States Government) through non-linear 
interactions. Next, the implications of the study are discussed. Then the areas for future 
research are suggested. Finally, the limitations associated with this study are highlighted. 
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SPE Hack: A Normal Accident in One System 
Perrow (2011) defines an “accident” as a “failure in a subsystem or the system as 
a whole that damages more than one unit, and in doing so disrupts the ongoing or future 
output of the system” (66). The trigger event of the crisis shut down multiple units within 
SPE post-hack. Once the GOP’s first email was accessed, multiple units of SPE’s 
computer database were damaged, and afterwards these damages transpired into a 
complete shut down of the studio’s production. The hack itself disrupted SPE’s output as 
a company, due to all employees and ongoing projects being halted to assess the database 
outage. SPE’s future output suffered because The Interview was removed from its 
scheduled release in theaters. Its expected financial gain through the cinematic 
distribution of The Interview across theaters nationwide was disrupted due to theaters 
closing in reaction to the hack. Thus, the SPE hack is independently a within-system 
accident as it identified the coupling between the SPE database, its film production, and 
the film’s release in theaters across the United States. The failure of the SPE database 
(subsystem 1) lead to the shutdown of studio daily operations (subsystem 2), and the 
removal of the film’s release in theaters (subsystem 3). 
Moreover, the crisis of SPE amassed victims, another identifier solidifying it as an 
‘accident’. The release of employees’ private personnel information to the public served 
as ‘victim exposure’ from damage during the accident (Perrow, 2011). The employees of 
SPE are operators of the system who have an influence on the organizations’ operation, 
and are so classified as ‘first-party victims.’ However, SPE employees in this particular 
case are ‘second-party victims’, as Perrow (2011) notes these victims are “those 
associated with the system as suppliers or users, but without influence over it. [. . .] They 
  46 
are voluntary actors who elect to participate in a system but have no influence over its 
operation” (p. 68). Because SPE’s employees did not directly influence, as operators, the 
accident’s creation to where it is classified as operator-error they cannot be categorized as 
first-party victims in this case. However, since they voluntarily agreed to a contract of 
employment with SPE they are obligated to accept any risks that stem from accidents 
throughout the occupation within the organization. 
Lastly, the SPE crisis serves as an organizational system accident that involved 
unanticipated interaction through loose coupling between various subsystems that 
resulted in multiple failures. The SPE database serves as one subsystem that was loosely 
coupled with other subsystems like its employees’ performance, theaters’ operation 
across the nation, and The Interview’s press circuit. Upon the failing of SPE’s database 
these other loosely coupled subsystems failed, and in turn accounted for a system wide 
accident. Next, I explain how two independent systems interacted with one another to 
form a separate crisis. 
How Two Independent Systems Suffered an Interconnected Accident 
 In this case, there existed two main systems that interacted: 1) Sony Pictures 
Entertainment and 2) U.S. Federal Government. A system is the main governing 
organization that is responsible for multiple sub-organizations that operate within it that 
are accountable for playing its role in ensuring the intended output of the entire system is 
fulfilled. Each system in this analysis contained varying subsystems that were impacted 
by the crisis (e.g., SPE’s computer database and the Department of Homeland Security). 
Moreover, certain subsystems, such as the FBI, from the U.S. Federal Government were 
used to assist with crisis response in the SPE system accident. These complex interactions 
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between these varying systems are loosely coupled since each system’s subsystems are 
not dependent on one other for product output under normal operations. However, to 
further understand how Normal Accidents theory can account for this case’s between-
systems complex interaction, this section will introduce and explain two new theoretical 
propositions: 1) common denominator and 2) common goal, these expand the Normal 
Accidents theory allowing it to account for and explain the coupling between two 
independent systems through non-linear interactions.  
Common Denominator 
A common denominator is identified as a shared feature across multiple people or 
a shared characteristic across different events. For the purposes of this study, a common 
denominator is defined as - a guiding principle that is shared and serves dual roles across 
different and independent major systems. This common denominator can serve as the 
point of interaction between two independent complex systems, which is sufficient to 
create a coupled state between the two. In this particular case study, both SPE and the 
Federal Government’s mode of operation is guided by the following common 
denominators – citizen security and American Freedom of Speech. 
The two complex systems may not be aware of their shared common 
denominator’s existence. If a system is aware of the common denominator it should 
account for its function in its crisis planning, being mindful of potential between-systems 
interaction. If a system is unaware of the common denominator during normal operations 
it has no bearing on the system’s crisis planning. A system might become aware of the 
common denominator when an unexpected non-linear change is experienced by one 
system prompted by a crisis in a different system. Additionally, a threat to a common 
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denominator shared by various organizations will not always prompt between-systems 
interactions. For example, many organizations share democratic decision making as a 
guiding principle, an attack on this principle in one organization may not disrupt other 
organizations. This means a change in the common denominator under one system may 
only affect that one system and its various internal subsystems. Thus, the common 
denominator can produce two possible interactions: 1) within one system or 2) between 
multiple systems. 
A brief example of two local universities in the State of Mississippi interacting 
with one another in response to a tornado that ravished one of the universities will better 
explain the role of the common denominator within and between complex systems. 
Hattiesburg, MS is home to both William Carey University and the University of 
Southern Mississippi (USM). Under normal circumstances both universities are 
adversaries in various metrics relating to university standing. Moreover, William Carey 
and USM are two complex systems that usually operate independently of one another. 
However, in January 2017 a tornado tore through the William Carey campus leaving it 
severely damaged and out of commission for normal business operations. In response, 
USM allocated its facilities to William Carey’s students and faculty so that William 
Carey could maintain its responsibilities throughout the semester. The reason for this 
intervention by USM to assist William Carey is because of the common denominator that 
they both share as Mississippi Universities – the academic success and retention of 
Mississippi based college students. Absent this common denominator that links these two 
rival universities together there would be no motivating factor for USM to interact with 
William Carey, an adversary. The tornado served as the threat against the common 
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denominator and prompted a non-linear interaction between these two independent 
systems. Without USM’s intervention to assist William Carey, the academic success and 
retention of William Carey students would have suffered greatly. This suffering would 
have in conjunction negatively impacted the overall academic success and retention of 
Mississippi college students, which is a guiding principle that is actively upheld by USM. 
Thus, this common denominator connected these two universities together in response to 
the crisis of one university. The deterioration of one independent system’s ability to 
uphold the common denominator prompted a separate system to intervene and contain the 
crisis to prevent the crisis from expanding. In the example above, the inability to sustain 
the common denominator in one system due to an existing threat is what lead for the 
interconnectedness between two separate systems. Regarding SPE and the Federal 
government, it was SPE’s failure to uphold the common denominator internally (within 
system) in response to the cyberattack (organizational crisis) that lead to the coupling 
between systems, and the manifestation of an even larger crisis at the national level with 
the U.S. Federal Government intervening.  
There were two common denominators that connected the two independent 
systems, SPE and Federal Government to produce a national security crisis – 1) citizen 
security and 2) American freedom of speech. The cyberattack on SPE was a direct 
consequential threat on employee safety; and in response the federal government was 
motivated to reduce further consequences on American people. Here the principle of 
citizen security acted as the first common denominator that coupled the two systems (see 
figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Common Denominator 1 Between SPE and Federal Government 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Common Denominator 2 Between SPE and Federal Government 
The second being the ultimatum given by the hackers to remove The Interview from 
theaters was an attack on American freedom of speech (see figure 2). These common 
denominators served as linkage between both SPE and the Federal Government. The 
cyberattack was a direct threat against these common denominators and SPE’s inability to 
contain the threat accordingly lead the Federal Government to intervene, prompting the 
resolution of a national security crisis. In addition to the common denominators, this case 
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highlights that for two separate systems to interact during the crisis of one that another 
element be met - common goal. Common goal is discussed below. 
Common Goal 
 As noted previously in the review of literature, Perrow (1961) briefly discusses 
the role that goals play in complex organizations. Perrow goes on to identify “official 
goals” and “operative goals”. Official goals being the general-purpose statements made 
by organizations to fulfill its legitimacy as an organization. And operative goals being the 
underlying tactics that are put in place and used to achieve the official goals. However, 
though official and operative goals are identified in the literature regarding complex 
organizations; the interconnectivity of goals between two separate complex organizations 
has not, nor has it been accounted for in Normal Accidents theory. Therefore, in this 
section, I introduce ‘common goal’ as a new proposition in extension of Normal 
Accidents theory to account for the interconnectedness of goals between systems during a 
crisis.  
In layman’s understanding, a common goal is a shared agenda for multiple people 
or a shared mission across various institutions. For this study and the purpose of 
expanding Normal Accidents theory, a common goal is defined as a general, shared 
course of action that is sought and tailored by different and independent systems to 
maintain congruency with their organizational values and principles. A common goal is 
one of the overarching practices of a system that is utilized to meet the common 
denominator, dependent on that common denominator’s individual responsibility within 
the system and between systems. For example, if the common denominator is financial 
longevity, the common goal would be achieving top line revenue growth markers year 
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after year. Like the common denominator, a complex system can be either aware or 
unaware of a common goal that exists between them and another system. 
 In the example of William Carey and USM noted previously, the two systems 
ostensibly share a common goal – the provision of consistent and high-quality education 
to Mississippi students. The common denominator that directly guides this goal is student 
success and retention. If a threat were to ever impact either institution then that would 
disrupt the common goal of either system, and connect the two systems. The complete 
destruction of the William Carey campus by the tornado served as that threat and made 
the university unable to meets its goal of providing a consistent and high-quality 
education for its students. In turn, USM shared its resources with William Carey to 
maintain this common goal and uphold the overall common denominator. Any threat to 
the system becomes a threat to meeting its goal and upholding its guiding principles. 
When these goals are common and systems have a common denominator, it transpires 
into a between-systems crisis rather than merely a within-system catastrophe. 
 SPE and the Federal Government have two common goals that were negatively 
affected that resulted in a national security crisis: 1) maintenance of system security and 
2) autonomously create and share modes of expression. The security breach that released 
47,000 SPE employee social security numbers, financial records, and personal 
information indicated that this terrorist group if they wanted to, through means of 
cyberterrorism, could hack into the Federal Government and harm other Americans by 
disseminating their personal information. Therefore, the SPE hack on employee 
information directly impacts the first common goal. Further, the potentiality of it 
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occurring beyond SPE walls served as a threat to American security, and merited national 
security involvement.  
The SPE’s compliance to the terrorist demand of removing The Interview from 
theaters was a clear violation of the second common goal as it directly prevented SPE 
from sharing its art. This compliance from SPE misrepresented the United States and 
portrayed it as a nation willing to succumb to terrorist demands regarding what the U.S. 
can and cannot produce and transmit, stripping the U.S. of its autonomy to express. 
United States leadership in turn acted immediately against this threat by making 
statements in opposition of SPE’s compliance towards stripping the movie. The Federal 
Government’s intervention because of SPE’s failure to manage the crisis appropriately 
and maintain the common goal solidified the coupling between the two systems as the 
SPE organizational crisis transformed into a national security crisis. The hindrance on 
these common goals perpetuated further nonlinear interactions between SPE and the 
Federal Government. Also, it showcased how two independent complex systems can be 
coupled together due to the accident in one that threatens against the common goal. 
 In sum, the addition of the common denominator and common goal propositions 
into the proposition repertoire of Normal Accidents theory expands the theory’s ability to 
explain multiple systems interaction. Rather than only accounting for the 
interconnectivity of subsystems within one complex system, these propositions allow 
Normal Accidents theory to be used in evaluating how two separate complex systems 
have the potential of coupling with one another via the identification of their common 
goals and denominators. Next, this chapter explores the implications that this case study 
provides the discipline of risk and crisis communication. 
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Implications 
This section identifies the implications of the SPE hack case study. First, 
implications related to the expansion of Normal Accidents theory are discussed. Second, 
the common denominator and common goal and their role in Normal Accidents theory is 
addressed. Finally, the use of these concepts by crisis communication practitioners is 
determined.  To start, the implications of Normal Accidents theory are noted. 
Expansion of Normal Accidents Theory 
 Perrow (1984) introduced Normal Accidents theory as a theory to explain why 
complex systems contain accidents. He noted that systems contain subsystems that are 
either loosely or tightly coupled, which allows them to interact with one another and that 
a disruption in one subsystem may lead to the failure of the entire system due to its 
interconnectivity with other subsystems. However, Perrow only discussed the accidents 
that stem within a single system and did not mention the possibility of a between systems 
accident. This case study expanded Normal Accidents theory so that it could explain how 
two independent systems can interact with one another in response to one system’s 
accident. It showcases that organizations share commonalities that once disrupted in one 
organization could potentially impact another. Crisis communication scholars should be 
more cognizant of these commonalities to better plan for the potentiality of a crisis 
occurring between systems. These commonalities are the common denominator and 
common goal, the following section discusses their role within Normal Accidents 
Theory. 
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Common Denominator and Common Goal 
 The common denominator and common goal provide an accentuation for how two 
independent systems can find themselves interconnected in light of a crisis impacting one 
of them. The common denominator indicates the shared common principles that each 
system carries. The common goal is the shared course of action carried out to uphold a 
certain common denominator. This case depicts how both SPE and the U.S. Federal 
Government share common denominators and goals that once thwarted at the helm of the 
cyber-attack lead to their coupling as systems and a national security crisis. The 
identification of the common denominator and common goal provides crisis 
communication practitioners with a vantage point for communication strategy 
development between two separate organizations. Furthermore, these propositions 
provide a linkage that explains how a private organization like SPE can interact with a 
public entity such as the U.S. Federal Government in response to a crisis. Strategies that 
would help organizations better communicate with one another to accommodate the 
potentiality of a crisis impacting them simultaneously. The utilization of these concepts 
in crisis assessment, crisis response development, and crisis planning will deem 
beneficial in the pre, during, and post stages of a crisis. The application of these 
propositions is addressed in the following section. 
Application of New Propositions 
 Practitioners should utilize these propositions to initially identify the probability 
of an interaction between two independent organizations during the crisis of one. The 
uncovering of interconnectedness between organizations could lead to extensive crisis 
prevention plans that take into consideration the motivation that exists and prompts 
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interaction with another organization in aim of resolving the crisis. For example, 
Hollywood production companies are now more alert in their crisis planning to the 
assistance of the Federal Government in relation to cyber security threats that 
compromise their organization’s safety and product output. Furthermore, awareness of 
common denominators and common goals will allow practitioners to assess past crises 
with more diligence to better uncover the underlying reasons for interconnectedness 
between systems. Also, with the common denominator and common goal in mind, 
practitioners can be more thoughtful in their crisis response development so that they 
uphold the systems’ common denominator(s) and continue to meet the systems’ common 
goal(s) without the risk of magnifying the already existing crisis. For example, if crisis 
communication practitioners at the time of the SPE hack crisis were vigilant to the 
common goal – autonomously sharing modes of expression – then they could have 
responded differently, by not complying to the terrorist demands, and in turn would have 
prevented the organizational crisis developing into one of national security. 
 This section highlighted the implications that stem from the SPE hack case. 
Implications related to the expansion of the Normal Accidents theory and what it means 
to the field of crisis communication was noted. The implications revolving the addition of 
the common denominator and common goal as theoretical propositions were discussed. 
Finally, implications on the application of these new propositions by crisis 
communication practitioners was addressed. In the following section, areas of future 
research are explored. 
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Future Research 
 This case study has provided significant additions and expansions to Normal 
Accidents theory that enhance the scholarship and practice of crisis communication. This 
section notes the academic and practical directions that can be made through the findings 
of this research. First, research exploring existing cases that contain the theoretical 
propositions provided in this study is proposed. Secondly, research related to cases that 
may contain only one of the propositions, or an evolution of either of the propositions, 
and how that affects a crisis is addressed. Finally, research focused on enhancing the 
understanding of accidents that occur between systems using the modified Normal 
Accidents theory is suggested. Research areas in existing cases are noted first. 
Existing Cases 
 This case study highlights how the coupling of two independent complex systems 
is possible and can be determined using the modified Normal Accidents theory. 
Currently, there exist cases that have shown signs of the theoretical propositions 
proposed in this study, and they should be assessed using this modified Normal Accidents 
theory to better understand the interconnectedness taking place between separate systems 
during a crisis. One case being the William Carey University tornado crisis and its 
coupling with the University of Southern Mississippi. An assessment of this case could 
enlighten other academic institutions nation/worldwide on how to interact with 
neighboring institutions for help in response to a natural disaster crisis impacting their 
campus. Another case is the FBI vs. Apple Inc. encryption dispute. Its unfolding could be 
studied using the new Normal Accidents theory propositions to make sense of how the 
FBI and Apple became interconnected systems in response to the 2015 San Bernardino 
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attack. Both organizations shared the common denominator – American security and 
privacy; however, they were at opposing ends on how they handled the crisis and the 
roles they each played as independent organizations while interacting. These cases, if 
studied using the new propositions suggested in this study would provide novel insight to 
the crisis communication discipline in further understanding between-system interaction. 
The following section addresses how future research should examine obscure cases that 
do not contain both propositions simultaneously, but each proposition individually and 
how that impacts the crisis and systems. 
Obscure Cases   
 The SPE hack crisis uncovers the existence of both the common denominator and 
common goal operating simultaneously amidst a crisis. However, not all between-
systems crises will contain both propositions, some may contain one or the other, or 
different evolutions of these propositions. For example, future studies could explore the 
possibility of uncommon denominators and uncommon goals. In other cases, it is likely 
that the same denominators and goals that are common between two separate 
organizations may also contradict one another dependent on the specific crisis and based 
on how each organization chooses to respond.  
Ultimately, it is vital for the crisis communication discipline to study cases that 
contain these evolutions as well as only one proposition during a crisis and assess how 
these variations change the progression of the crisis, the relationship between the two 
affected systems, and any other subsequent analyses. This type of research will indicate 
which of the propositions carries more weight in impacting the interconnectedness 
between systems in a crisis, and whether the propositions’ opposing evolutions have any 
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impact on the case and its end result. Uncovering such insight will allow crisis 
communication practitioners to develop crisis plans that are geared towards addressing 
each specific proposition to better handle the intricacies of the accident. 
Between-System Accident Dynamic 
 Currently, there is not much existing research that studies uses Normal Accidents 
theory to study the interaction between two independent complex systems during a crisis, 
especially systems of varying nature – private vs. public. Existing research using Normal 
Accidents theory primarily focuses on strictly one system, its subsystems, how the system 
is affected by a crisis, and a crisis communication strategy for within-system response. 
However, from this case study it is evident that more cases involving between-systems 
interaction in face of a crisis should be looked at using Normal Accidents theory; in order 
to identify fresh perspective on future crisis communication and strategies. If more 
research revolving between-systems interaction is conducted it will provide the crisis 
communication discipline with further scholarship that supports a means to accommodate 
these unique crises. Furthermore, with more between-systems focused research new 
expansions to theories such as Normal Accidents theory will occur allowing us to better 
study future cases with more versatile theories. It is essential to conduct this type of 
research so that organizations become aware of their interconnectivity with other 
organizations. And crisis communication practitioners can then teach organizations’ 
stakeholders how to navigate within this potential interconnectedness during times of 
accidents and crisis. Next, I address the limitations of this research. 
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Limitations 
 The following section will consist of a forthright discussion of the limitation of 
this research. Specifically, I address the information outlets utilized to compile the data, 
and the types of sources used as data for this case. Initially, I explore the information 
outlets used in this project. 
Information Outlets 
 For this study, only American news outlets and government documents were used 
and examined for the case. International news outlets, and the North Korean 
Government’s communication may have provided a different perspective on the case and 
the crisis’s unfolding. However, seeing as the U.S. was the victim in this crisis, it made 
sense to narrow the frame of reference to that of the American media for consistency in 
coverage and government communication. Following, I address the types of sources used 
to build this case and how it is a potential second limitation. 
Data Source Type 
 Only existing sources were used to build the case. Should the study have included 
interviews of SPE employees (i.e., victims of the hack) conducted by the researcher, the 
shaping of the case may have been different. Nonetheless, the media outlets acquired for 
this study contain interviews with both SPE employees, leadership, and government 
officials; which all support the building of the case’s timeline and happening from those 
directly impacted and involved. Ultimately, future studies involving the SPE hack of 
2014 could include information from international news outlets and international 
government documents to broaden the perspective of the case. Furthermore, direct 
interviews by the researcher with SPE employees, leadership, and government officials 
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who were either involved or impacted during the hack would potentially provide a deeper 
understanding of the crisis and how it unfolded. 
Overall Conclusion 
 Accidents occur in organizations and are deemed normal, especially when these 
organizations are complex ones. The Sony Pictures Entertainment hack crisis of 2014 
spiraled into a national security crisis that required the intervention of the United States 
Federal Government. This crisis was a unique organizational crisis as it connected a 
private organization and public entity, who normally would not interact with each other, 
in response to one system accident. Normal Accidents theory accounts for within-systems 
accidents arising from subsystem interconnectedness and malfunction. However, it does 
not explore the interconnectedness of two separate systems in response to a crisis in one. 
This case study expanded Normal Accidents theory and used it to explain the 
interconnectivity between two separate, major complex systems. 
Consequently, this crisis proved a worthy case study for crisis communication 
scholars and practitioners. It displayed a novel phenomenon that limited crisis 
communication research has explored: between private and public organization 
interaction during a high stress crisis event analyzed using Normal Accidents theory. This 
research, using the SPE hack crisis as its primary case, expanded normal accidents theory 
by introducing two new propositions: 1) common denominator and 2) common goal, that 
accounted for between-systems interaction during a crisis. Moreover, the study answered 
its research question: the reason for why an accident in one system can lead to an 
interaction within a different system and later catalyze a separate crisis is because of the 
harm to the systems’ common denominators and common goals. This study demonstrated 
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the importance of the common denominator and common goal in identifying the potential 
coupling of two systems in light of a crisis. This research provided progressive impact to 
the risk and crisis communication discipline through its expansion of the Normal 
Accidents theory and practical findings. The SPE hack crisis which later became a 
national security crisis is a strong case study for assisting in the development of future 
crisis responses, crisis planning, and crisis assessment. 
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